---
title: "Beth Hammack: Lessons from a Burning River · Nov 17, 2026"
description: Hammack uses a Treasury-market panel to lay out her personal principles for Fed intervention, and the first principle is a high bar.
source: Helious
canonical: "https://helious.io/news/f15707c18d5c7897e86b9c78ebfb94d1/lessons-from-a-burning-river"
---

Fed speak
              17 Nov 2026, 19:25 UTC



# Lessons from a Burning River







## SPEECH DIGEST


            HAWKISH
          low confidence · 16.4k characters read

        Hammack uses a Treasury-market panel to lay out her personal principles for Fed intervention, and the first principle is a high bar. She says the April 2025 turbulence stayed within historical norms and did not warrant action, and she wants any future market-functioning purchases held in a separate portfolio, reported as a separate line item, and sold off promptly. There is no rate-path content here at all: no front-end signal, no vote, no dissent, no reading on the near-term policy path. What is marketable is the balance-sheet reaction function, and on the new content it reads a touch tighter than the March 2020 precedent.


          **What’s new: **Nothing on rates, inflation or the near-term policy path, so nothing for the front end to reprice. The genuinely new items are framework views from a sitting voter: an explicit retrospective judgment that April 2025 market stress did not meet her intervention bar, an endorsement of a separate balance-sheet portfolio and line item to ring-fence financial-stability purchases, and public support for specific SRP enhancements (all-day availability, FedNow funds availability before 8am ET, bilateral or centrally cleared execution). The 2020 lessons and the BOE comparison are recycled ground.



### KEY FINDINGS





- She sets a high bar and applies it retrospectively to April 2025: "There was market chatter that the Fed should step in, but based on what I saw, liquidity conditions and other market-functioning metrics stayed within historical norms." A voter publicly endorsing non-intervention in the most recent stress episode argues against a Fed put in the belly and long end, and cheapens the tail hedge the market has been paying up for.

- Any purchases should be ring-fenced: a separate portfolio for financial-stability purchases, reported as a separate line item, with "holdings should be sold in a timely way once market financial stability is restored." Constrains the duration footprint and unwind timeline of any future intervention, so a stress-driven buy program should carry a smaller and shorter-lived duration premium than 2020.

- She doubts repo alone would have sufficed in 2020 ("I doubt repos would have been enough in 2020"), leaving Treasury purchases on the table if repo operations prove insufficient. Caps how hawkish this reads: the tail scenario still includes Fed coupon purchases, just with a pre-announced exit.

- She wants the standing repo facility improved rather than replaced: available at any time during the business day, possibly linked to FedNow so funds arrive before 8am ET, and with counterparties able to choose bilateral or central clearing. Plumbing, not policy, but it should firm the effective fed funds rate's floor near the target range and reduce the odds of a money-market spike forcing a balance-sheet response.

- She argues the Fed is better placed than Treasury to relieve market-functioning stress because Treasury's buybacks are funded through planned issuance: "Given Treasury's constraints, the Fed is generally better positioned to alleviate market-functioning stress." Signals the burden of future intervention sits on the Fed's balance sheet rather than on Treasury issuance policy, a mild tail hedge for long-end supply risk.





### FROM THE DOCUMENT


            First, the bar for intervention should be high.
            There was market chatter that the Fed should step in, but based on what I saw, liquidity conditions and other market-functioning metrics stayed within historical norms.
            When poor liquidity conditions in volatile markets reflect fundamentals, it is not a problem the Fed can or should try to solve.
            It should also be temporary, and holdings should be sold in a timely way once market financial stability is restored.

            We serve the American people as part of the US central bank. We support the US economy and our region by studying economic conditions and issues that impact our communities, serving financial institutions, and providing economic education and resources for all. The Fed does more than inform monetary policy. Learn about the mission, structure, and role of our organization, both regionally and nationally. Community outreach, education, and research are central to the Fed’s mission. Connect with us as we share our work, latest publications, and welcome you to visit our learning center. We produce indicators and datasets to inform the public, policymakers, and researchers about economic conditions, including inflation, employment, and risks to the financial system. Visit our Center for Inflation Research for all things inflation—from general information on how inflation works and why it matters to the latest data and analysis on current inflationary trends. Visit our Center for Inflation Research for all things inflation—from general information on how inflation works and why it matters to the latest data and analysis on current inflationary trends. Our research informs the public and

Thank you to the Brookings Institution for the kind invitation to speak today and to all of you for being here. It's a real pleasure to speak with a group that spends as much time thinking about the Treasury market as I do. I always aim to bring with me a Cleveland perspective when I speak outside the Fourth District. And while obviously not Cleveland’s finest moment, one of the more famous chapters in our city’s history is when the Cuyahoga River caught fire not just once, but more than a dozen times over the last century. The 1969 fire is the one most people remember; it was actually pretty small, but it became a turning point for the environmental protection movement. Then-Mayor Carl Stokes publicized the event and used the fire as an opportunity to encourage reform that ultimately led to the founding of the EPA in 1970.




        [
          Read the full Fed speech at the source →](https://www.clevelandfed.org/collections/speeches/2026/sp-20261117-lessons-from-a-burning-river)




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