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Fed speak

Innovation in the relationships between central banks and central counterparties

SPEECH DIGEST

NEUTRAL high confidence · 12.8k characters read

Logan gives a structural speech on how central banks and central counterparties interact, covering three roles: market participant, issuer of money and payments operator, and lender of last resort. There is no read on the policy rate, the economy, or the near-term path for the funds rate; this is a plumbing and market-infrastructure speech. The market-relevant content is regulatory and long-horizon: the argument that access to Fed accounts, frozen at eight SIFMUs designated in 2012, may be unfit for purpose now that crypto, prediction market contracts and new CCPs exist, plus a floated idea for a separate central bank CCP membership class.

What’s new: Nothing material for the front end or the curve. Against what is already public, the new content is: an explicit suggestion of a distinct CCP membership type for central banks that would not carry clearing-member liquidity obligations; a pointed observation that the SIFMU/DFMU universe has not been touched since 2012 despite new instruments and new CCPs; and the framing of voluntary central clearing of the Fed's own open market operations as a live question tied to the SEC Treasury clearing mandate. All of it is policy-plumbing, not rate policy.

KEY FINDINGS

  • Logan floats "a distinct CCP membership type for the central bank, not subject to the liquidity requirements," so that a central bank clearing its own market transactions does not get captured by clearing-member liquidity obligations that "would be blurred" with its lender-of-last-resort role. It is a concrete, if early, design idea that would let the Fed centrally clear OMOs without creating an implicit liquidity backstop through CCP rulebooks.
  • She stresses that Fed account access and central bank money settlement turn on SIFMU designation, and that "There are eight SIFMUs, all designated in 2012 in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)." Signals that the gate for reserve-account and settlement access is stale, a live regulatory risk for crypto and prediction-market clearing venues seeking Fed money settlement.
  • On Treasury clearing: the SEC mandate takes effect in cash at end-2026 and repo in mid-2027, and Fed officials and staff "have noted the potential benefits of centrally clearing the Fed's open market operations." Reinforces that Fed OMO clearing is on the table and that the Fed wants its funding to reach counterparties at lower balance sheet cost; supports repo market structure but is not new.
  • Payments-side capacity is expanding: Fedwire Funds runs 22 hours Monday through Friday, with Sunday and weekday holiday operations intended by 2028 or 2029, and the Board said it would "monitor industry demand and stand ready to offer an additional expansion." Long-dated but directionally relevant for money market plumbing and time-critical liquidity, not for near-term pricing.
  • The asymmetry across jurisdictions is laid out plainly: the Bank of England makes CCPs eligible for standing facilities and the discount window, the ECB has a dedicated overnight CCP facility now made permanent and "immediately available," while the Fed can lend to a DFMU "only in unusual or exigent circumstances." Highlights that the US CCP liquidity backstop is the most restrictive of the major jurisdictions, a standing tail-risk gap in dollar funding stress.

FROM THE DOCUMENT

In the United States, a CCP can obtain an account at a Federal Reserve Bank and settle in central bank money only if the Financial Stability Oversight Council designates the CCP as a systemically important financial market utility (SIFMU), also known as a designated financial market utility (DFMU).
There are eight SIFMUs, all designated in 2012 in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
If a central bank became subject to these requirements because it chose to clear its market transactions through a CCP, the roles would be blurred.
One innovation that could conceivably solve this problem would be a distinct CCP membership type for the central bank, not subject to the liquidity requirements.

Central counterparties (CCPs) make markets safer and more efficient by stepping between counterparties to transactions, serving as buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer, and guaranteeing that the transactions will be completed. To fulfill that guarantee, CCPs must mitigate the many risks that could cause a transaction to fail: the credit risk that a participant defaults, the market risk that prices move adversely, the liquidity risk that cash is not available at the required instant, and the operational risk that some necessary element of a trade—like a physical commodity or a security—is not present at the required time and place. The methods CCPs employ to mitigate these risks are diverse. However, at an extremely high level—let’s call it 500,000 feet, near where low Earth orbit begins—I think of CCPs as transforming most risks into liquidity risk. For example, CCPs mitigate credit and market risk through frequent collection and payment of margin, but those margin calls require liquidity from the CCP and its participants. So, CCPs must manage the resulting concentrated liquidity risk extremely carefully. CCPs also employ multilateral netting to cancel out offsetting tra

Thank you to Cindy [Hull] and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Financial Markets Group (FMG) for the opportunity to speak today. FMG and this conference have a special place in my heart. It’s great to be back here and to see so many distinguished colleagues from around the world. These are my views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System. Central counterparties (CCPs) make markets safer and more efficient by stepping between counterparties to transactions, serving as buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer, and guaranteeing that the transactions will be completed.

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